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Abstract The scientific community has witnessed growing
concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable
results within the psychological literature, but the harmful im-
pact of false negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives
are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrat-
ing the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of uncon-
scious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes
seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit
behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level perfor-
mance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of aware-
ness. A systematic review of 73 studies of contextual cuing, a
popular implicit learning paradigm, involving 181 statistical
analyses of awareness tests, reveals how underpowered studies
can lead to failure to reject a false null hypothesis. Among the
studies that reported sufficient information, the meta-analytic
effect size across awareness tests was dz = 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24–
0.37), showing that participants’ learning in these experiments
was conscious. The unusually large number of positive results
in this literature cannot be explained by selective publication.
Instead, our analyses demonstrate that these tests are typically
insensitive and underpowered to detect medium to small, but
true, effects in awareness tests. These findings challenge a
widespread and theoretically important claim about the extent
of unconscious human cognition.
Keywords Contextual cuing . False negatives . Implicit
learning . Null hypothesis Significance testing· Statistical
power
Research practices in the behavioral sciences are under scru-
tiny to an extent that would have been inconceivable 10 years
ago. Much of the debate has concerned habits (such as “p-
hacking” and the filedrawer effect) which can boost the prev-
alence of false positives in the published literature (Ioannidis,
Munafò, Fusar-Poli, Nosek, & David, 2014; Simmons, Nel-
son, & Simonsohn, 2011). Much less attention has been paid
to the harmful consequences of false negatives, namely reports
which purport to present evidence supporting false null hy-
potheses (Fiedler, Kurtzner, & Krueger, 2012). Via meta-
analysis of a particular sub-literature within the field of im-
plicit learning, we demonstrate how the use of underpowered
experiments and Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
(NHST) can combine to encourage the reporting of false neg-
atives and consequent theoretical distortion.
When a researcher obtains a result that is significant at p <
.05 and consequently reports that the null hypothesis is
rejected, then of course we have learned something: That the
likelihood of obtaining data at least as extreme as those that
were observed, if the null hypothesis is true, is less than 5 %.
Many would argue that we have not learned very much – for
example, we have not learned that the null hypothesis is false
or unlikely (Dienes, 2011; Fidler & Loftus, 2009). In contrast,
when the researcher finds a result that is not significant (p >
.05) and consequently concludes that the null hypothesis can-
not be rejected, from the point of view of NHST we have
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learned literally nothing. We have not learned that the exper-
imental hypothesis is false (the experiment may be underpow-
ered) nor have we learned that the null hypothesis is true. Thus
there is a sense in which any conclusions drawn from failures
to reject the null hypothesis are intrinsically more problematic
than those drawn from rejections of the null.
Underpowered studies are a major contributing factor to
the reporting of both false positives and false negatives
(Button et al., 2013). The power of typical studies in psychol-
ogy, combined with typical effect sizes, indicates that the liter-
ature contains far more significant results than it should, sug-
gesting that it is therefore biased in favor of significant findings
(false positives) rejecting true null hypotheses (Francis, 2012).
But low power might also contribute to the reporting of false
negatives, when authors wish to demonstrate the absence of
some effect. For instance, the absence of judgmental biases
outside the laboratory (e.g., List, 2002), the absence of gender
differences in math performance (e.g., Hyde, Lindberg, Linn,
Ellis, & Williams, 2008), the absence of differences between
studies run in the laboratory versus online (McGraw, Tew, &
Williams, 2000), the absence of awareness in studies of implic-
it processing, and many other such influential claims depend
on null effects which could potentially be false negatives if
based on low-powered studies. NHST provides further impe-
tus, in that its dichotomous nature (significant/nonsignificant at
the arbitrary p = .05 cliff-edge) and focus on rejection of the
null hypothesis encourage both researchers and students to
interpret failure to reject the null hypothesis as implying that
the null hypothesis is true (Hoekstra, Finch, Kiers, & Johnson,
2006). As Fidler and Loftus (2009) note, “this kind of almost
irresistible logical slippage can, and often does, lead to all
manner of interpretational mischief later on” (p. 29).
Confidence intervals (CIs) have an important role to play in
the interpretation of null results (but see Hoekstra, Morey,
Rouder, &Wagenmakers, 2014). If such intervals include zero
but are narrow, then it can safely be concluded that the effect
in question is either small or negligible in magnitude (though
of course it cannot be concluded that the effect is non-exis-
tent). But if the intervals are wide, then little confidence can be
placed on the null result and a motivation is provided for
running larger sample sizes. Equally important is the role that
meta-analysis can play in reaching valid conclusions across
bodies of research featuring null results. Even though individ-
ual underpowered studies may fail to reject the null hypothe-
sis, meta-analysis across a set of such studies may permit
modest but real effects to be detected.
In the present research we illustrate these issues via a system-
atic review of a large body of studies within the field of implicit
learning. These studies depend crucially on null results in aware-
ness checks, because implicit learning by definition involves
mental processing in the absence of awareness. As we show,
the majority of these studies are underpowered to detect small
but real awareness effects. We illustrate how the computation of
CIs (and their graphic depiction) and meta-analysis can lead to
radically different conclusions from those reached in the indi-
vidual studies themselves. Our results challenge a theoretically
crucial conclusion drawn from this body of research.
Null results as a crucial feature of research
on implicit processing
Research on implicit processing provides an excellent exam-
ple to illustrate the consequences of overreliance on NHST to
gather support for the null hypothesis. In a typical experiment
on implicit processing, participants’ performance on some task
is above a baseline level, but this behavioral outcome is seem-
ingly not accompanied by any awareness of the environmental
cues or regularities that gave rise to the behavior. For instance,
in research on subliminal perception, some form of behavior is
primed by a briefly-flashed stimulus of which participants are
unaware (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998); research in neuropsy-
chology suggests that perception, memory, and choices can
be influenced by cues unconsciously in various patient popu-
lations (Bechara et al., 1995; Cohen & Squire, 1980; Goodale,
Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991); in research on behavior
priming, some behavioral response such as voting intentions
(Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, & Gross, 2007), walking speed
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996), or answering general
knowledge questions (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998) is influenced by a subtle cue without participants being
aware of this influence; research on implicit moral judgments,
emotions, and attitudes proposes that behaviors in each of
these domains can again be influenced by environmental cues
unconsciously (Bargh, 2006;Williams&Bargh, 2008), and so
on. Usually the absence of awareness is inferred from a null
result in an awareness test (Dienes, 2015). For example, par-
ticipants might fail to detect stimuli in a forced-choice test or
they might perform at chance when asked to exert some con-
trol over the cue’s influence on their behavior.
However, as mentioned above, null results in NHST are
inherently ambiguous. They can mean either that the null hy-
pothesis is true or that there is insufficient evidence to reject it.
In the context of implicit processing experiments, this means
that when an awareness test yields a non-significant result, this
can indicate either that participants were really unconscious of
the cue or that the awareness test is inadequate to permit a firm
conclusion about whether participants were aware or not. Un-
fortunately, the statistical analyses reported in many implicit
processing experiments are insufficient to test which of these
two interpretations is more plausible. A Bayesian approach to
statistical analysis might allow researchers to quantify to what
extent null results reflect a real absence of effects or a lack of
statistical sensitivity (Dienes, 2015; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). However, these Bayesian analyses
are seldom conducted (or reported) on data from awareness
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tests. Furthermore, researchers sometimes report so little in-
formation in their statistical analyses that it is also difficult for
other researchers to compute these Bayesian analyses on re-
ported data.
This problem is clearly illustrated by current research in
a popular implicit learning paradigm known as contextual
cuing (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Chun & Turk-Browne, 2008),
which is the focus of the systematic review conducted here.
In a typical contextual cuing experiment, participants are
shown search displays containing a T-shaped target among
a number of L-shaped distractors (see Fig. 1). The target is
always rotated, so that the stem of the T points either to the
left or to the right. Participants are instructed to find the T
as fast as possible and report its orientation using two dif-
ferent keys. The search displays presented in half of the
trials are repeated several times across training, while the
remaining search displays are randomly generated in each
trial, although participants are not informed about this ma-
nipulation. Across training blocks, participants’ reaction
times (RTs) decrease systematically as they become famil-
iar with the task. But, most importantly, this decrease is
larger for repeated than for random search displays, indi-
cating that across trials participants eventually learn some-
thing specific about the repeating patterns. That is to say,
some mental representation is acquired of repeating dis-
plays which allows attention to be more and more rapidly
deployed to the location where the target will be found
(Chun & Jiang, 1998). This learning effect on RTs is highly
robust and indeed is obtained in the vast majority of con-
textual cuing experiments.
Usually, the implicitness of this learning is assessed by
means of a recognition test conducted at the end of the
experiment. Participants are shown all the repeating pat-
terns intermixed with new random patterns and are asked
to report whether they have already seen each of those pat-
terns. The learning effect found during the training phase is
considered implicit if the number of patterns correctly rec-
ognized as old in the recognition test (hits) is no larger than
the number of random patterns wrongly classified as old
(false alarms), or if participants’ performance is at chance
(50 % correct) overall. Another popular test used to assess
whether learning was implicit is to ask participants to guess
where the target would be in a search display where the
target has been replaced by an additional distractor. If they
perform at chance in this task, their learning about the re-
peating search configurations is again considered implicit.
In both procedures, learning is assumed to be unconscious
if a statistical comparison yields a null result.
However, as explained above, the statistical analyses typi-
cally conducted in these studies do not allow one to conclude
that the null effects observed in the awareness tests reflect
truly random performance. Meta-analysis across the whole
body of experiments published in this domain permits us to
check whether these null results reflect a real absence of
awareness. Based on the relative proportions of significant
results or on the overall trends of mean performance in aware-
ness tests it is possible to measure to what extent the preva-
lence of null results reveals a genuine absence of awareness or
merely insensitivity of statistical data in individual studies.
Proportion and distribution of significant results
To assess to what extent the null results observed in these
analyses reflect a real absence of awareness or a mere lack
of statistical sensitivity, we conducted a systematic review
of the literature. As explained in Appendix 1, we included
in our analyses all the experiments that found spatial con-
textual cueing and that included either of the two
Fig. 1 Panel A shows a sequence of search displays as used in standard
contextual cuing experiments. Participants are instructed to search for a T-
shaped target among a series of L-shaped distractors. Some search
displays are regularly repeated during training, whilst others are new,
unrepeated (random) displays. Panel B shows the typical pattern of
results: Participants become faster at finding the target among the
distractors in repeated displays
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awareness tests explained above (i.e., a recognition test or
a target guessing test).
By definition, research on implicit processing assumes that
participants lack awareness of the relevant regularity, and ac-
cordingly 78.5% of the awareness tests yielded nonsignificant
(p > .05) differences. However, 21.5 % of the awareness tests
did yield a significant difference, well above (binomial p <
.001) the theoretical 5 % of false positives that should be
observed if the one-tailed null hypothesis is true with a stan-
dard α = .05. This proportion of significant results becomes
particularly striking if we take into account that most of these
statistical contrasts actually relied on two-tailed t-tests, for
which the theoretical proportion of false positives would be
just 2.5 %. The proportion of significant (p < .05) or margin-
ally significant (.05 < p < .10) results was 27.6 %, again above
the theoretical 10 % that would be predicted on the null hy-
pothesis given a one-tailed test, binomial p < .001.
Regardless of the results of the inferential analyses, we also
coded for each study whether participants performed numeri-
cally above chance (+1), exactly at chance (0), or below
chance (-1) (see Appendix 1 for further details). The mean
value of this direction score across experiments was 0.53
(95 % CI 0.41–0.66), far above the theoretical 0 that should
be observed under the null hypothesis, t(165) = 8.468, p <
.001, dz = 0.66. The proportion of experiments scoring 1
was 66.9 %, significantly above 50 % in a binomial test, p <
.001. Interestingly, within our database, the vast majority of
experiments that reported a significant result had direction
scores of 1. A logistic regression confirmed that there was a
relationship between the direction scores and the probability
of a significant result in the awareness tests, B = 1.37, SEB =
0.483, Wald = 8.114, Odds ratio = 3.95, Model χ2(1) = 16.11,
p < .001. In other words, significant results were far more
likely to be associated with numerically above- than below-
chance performance in the awareness test.
Overall, these results are not consistent with the idea that
the null hypothesis reflects the true distribution of results in
the awareness tests. On a true null hypothesis (hits = false
alarms in the awareness test, or performance equal to chance),
only around 5 % of studies should yield a significant result,
and the number of effects in the “explicit” direction should
equal those in the wrong direction. There should be no ten-
dency for significant awareness results to be more prevalent in
one direction than the other.
Is there publication bias in the results of awareness
tests?
However, it is still possible that the null hypothesis is true and
that the unusually large number of significant results reflects a
bias favoring the publication of significant results versus non-
significant results. Even if participants perform at chance in
the awareness test, occasionally the statistical analyses will
yield a significant result by mere chance. If researchers or
journals are biased towards publishing significant results, then
the proportion of these in the published literature will exceed
the theoretical proportion of false alarms that would be expect-
ed under the null hypothesis. Although this hypothesis might
appear counterintuitive given that truly implicit learning re-
quires null awareness, it is important to evaluate this possibil-
ity within the studies included in the meta-analysis.
Deviations from chance are more likely to occur in low
quality experiments where the measurement error is larger
(e.g., smaller samples or unreliable methods). That is to say,
under the null hypothesis, large and significant effect sizes are
more likely to be obtained in low- than in high-powered ex-
periments. In meta-analyses, this trend is usually represented
by means of a funnel plot representing the relationship be-
tween effect size and the measurement error. Unfortunately,
it is difficult to draw a funnel plot with the information avail-
able in our dataset because many experiments did not report
sufficient statistical information to compute effect sizes. For
instance, standard errors and exact t-values were reported only
in roughly half of the analyses. However, if publication bias
were responsible for the unusually large number of significant
results, then one would expect to find more significant results
in low quality studies.
An important determinant of the quality of an experiment is
the number of trials on which its measurement is based. The
impact of random variance on the results can beminimized if a
dependent variable is based on a larger number of observa-
tions. In the case of contextual cuing experiments, a large
number of trials in the awareness test should yield less vari-
able results and, therefore, a more precise measurement of
awareness. Figure 2A shows the relationship between the
number of trials and statistical significance. Dark bars repre-
sent significant (black) or marginally significant (dark red)
results. The height of each bar represents the number of trials
in the awareness test. As can be seen, if anything, the pattern
of results is the opposite of what would be predicted on the
basis of a publication bias: Null results are more prevalent
among experiments including a small number of awareness
trials. A logistic regression confirmed that the probability of
finding a significant result increases as the number of trials
increases, B = 0.024, SEB = 0.009,Wald = 7.238, Odds ratio =
1.024, Model χ2(1) = 8.068, p = .005. Smyth and Shanks
(2008) observed the same pattern in a single experiment: An
awareness measure which was not significantly different from
chance when based on 24 trials became significant when
based on 96. The present results show that this pattern holds
in aggregate across published studies.
Sample size, defined as the number of participants, is an-
other important determinant of the methodological quality of
an experiment. Studies conducted on larger samples are more
likely to yield results that converge to the true effect size.
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Figure 2B shows the relationship between sample size and
statistical significance in contextual cuing experiments. The
height of each bar represents the sample size of the study. As
in the case of the previous analysis, a logistic regression sug-
gests that the probability of finding a significant result grows
with sample size, B = 0.024, SEB = 0.013,Wald = 3.247, Odds
ratio = 1.024, Model χ2(1) = 3.128, p = .077. Although only
marginally significant, this trend goes in the opposite direction
from the one predicted if the high number of positive results
were due to a publication bias favoring significant results over
non-significant ones.
A defender of the implicit nature of contextual cuing could
argue that awareness truly is absent in these studies, and that
publication bias explains the prevalence of significant results
in the meta-analysis. The results above show that this hypoth-
esis is implausible and that the prevalence is not attributable to
publication bias. However, they also show something else of
importance, namely that many of the reported null results are
likely to be false negatives arising from underpowered studies.
As the quality of the measurement improves in terms of sam-
ple size and number of observations, it becomes appreciably
more likely that the study will yield evidence of awareness.
Effect sizes and statistical power
Overall, these analyses suggest that there is a true positive
effect in the awareness tests employed in the studies included
in the meta-analysis, and that failures to reach statistical sig-
nificance are largely due to the small number of observations
registered in most experiments, both in terms of sample size
and in the number of trials included in the awareness test.
Additional evidence for this interpretation can be obtained
by exploring the typical size of the effect found in the aware-
ness tests.
In many of the studies included in the present analyses, the
authors failed to report sufficient information to compute the
effect size of the results of the awareness test. Very frequently,
the only piece of information available was that p-values were
larger than .05, without additional details about t- or F-values.
However, we were able to compute effect sizes for 96 of the
statistical contrasts included in our data set. Based on sample
sizes, reported t-values or, alternatively, one-degree-of-
freedom F-statistics we were able to compute Cohen’s dz ef-
fect size scores. We coded dz scores as positive if the outcome
went in the “explicit” direction (e.g., hit rate > false-alarm rate,
regardless of significance) and as negative if the pattern of
results was the opposite. Given the significant heterogeneity
of effect sizes, Q(95) = 160.78, p < .001, we conducted a
meta-analysis on dz scores using a random effects model.
The meta-analytic mean dz was 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24–0.37).
Interestingly, although small, the meta-analytic effect size
remains significantly greater than zero even if one actively
removes from the meta-analysis all the statistical contrasts that
turned out to be individually significant, dz = 0.16 (95 % CI
0.10–0.22). Thus aggregate awareness is evident even
amongst those studies that obtained no significant awareness
and were on that basis interpreted as showing implicit learn-
ing. This speaks against the possibility that the studies in the
meta-analysis represent two quite distinct sub-groups, one in
which learning is truly conscious and one in which it is truly
unconscious. Even when the true conscious studies are re-
moved, the remainder yield above-chance awareness.
It is important to acknowledge the real size might be small-
er than our meta-analytic estimate of dz = 0.31. The t- and F-
values were less likely to be reported when awareness tests
failed to reach statistical significance, because in many of
those cases the authors simply noted that p-values were larger
than .05. Even so, assuming that 0.31 is approximately the
true dz of the typical awareness test, it is possible to compute
what would be the required sample size to achieve a specific
level of statistical power. Using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) we found that, assuming a dz of .31, a
sample size of at least 66 participants would be needed to
achieve statistical power of .80 in a one-tailed paired-samples
t-test. For the more frequent two-tailed t-test, the figure goes
up to 84. But recall that, as just mentioned, 0.31 might over-
estimate or underestimate the real effect size.
Most interestingly, the medianN of all the contrasts includ-
ed in the meta-analysis (also including the ones for which dz
could not be calculated) was 16. The statistical power of a
sample of 16 participants to obtain a significant two-tailed
effect given a dz of 0.31 is around .21. Note that this range
of statistical powers is virtually identical to the proportion of
significant results (21.5 %) observed in our dataset. Given the
Fig. 2 Contextual cuing experiments sorted by the number of trials of the
awareness test (top panel) or by sample size (lower panel). Black bars
denote statistical contrasts with significant results. Red bars denote
statistical contrasts with marginally significant results
Psychon Bull Rev (2016) 23:87–102 91
small size of the effect found in the typical awareness test, the
average sample sizes used in these studies are seriously un-
derpowered. At the same time, the distribution of significant
and nonsignificant results is close to what would be expected
if the awareness results in individual studies are sampled from
a distribution with a mean effect size of around .30.
Effect size in implicit versus explicit measures
It might be countered that this effect size in the awareness test
is far too small to account for the usually large contextual
cueing effect found in these experiments, as the typical con-
textual cueing experiment yields effect sizes well above dz = 1
on the implicit RT measure. If participants had conscious ac-
cess to the representations learned in contextual cuing, why
should this knowledge yield larger effects when assessed by
means of visual search than when measured by means of an
awareness test? This concern neglects the fact that contextual
cuing and awareness are measured with radically different
procedures. Even if they were measuring exactly the same
memory trace, the differences between the procedures are so
numerous that it would be naïve to expect the same effect size
in both of them. Just to mention a clear difference, contextual
cuing is traditionally assessed by gathering reaction times
from hundreds of trials (usually more than 500 across the
experiment). In contrast, awareness is assessed by means of
just a few discrete responses. As can be seen in Fig. 2A, the
number of trials rarely goes beyond 24 or 40. One cannot
expect to find the same precision in a dependent variable
based on a few observations of a discrete response as in one
based on hundreds of observations of a continuous measure,
even if those two dependent variables are measuring exactly
the same latent variable.
In fact, when other constraints are taken into account, a
small effect size is exactly what one would expect to find in
any measure of contextual cuing that is not based on a very
large number of observations. The available evidence
shows that the faster reaction times found in repeated pat-
terns are usually attributable to a small number of search
displays (Schlagbauer, Müller, Zehetleitner, & Geyer,
2012; Smyth & Shanks, 2008). In other words, participants
seem to learn very little or nothing about most of the search
displays. Furthermore, it is also known that even for the
search displays that elicit some learning, participants do
not seem to acquire detailed information about all the ele-
ments in the search display. Instead, they seem to learn
something only about the two or three distractors that hap-
pen to be closest to the target (Brady & Chun, 2007; Olson
& Chun, 2002). Trying to detect these fragmentary mem-
ory traces in a brief recognition test, where each pattern is
only presented once, is like finding a needle in a haystack.
It is hardly surprising that the resulting effects are small.
To further explore how small these effects can be, we con-
ducted a simulation of the results which one could expect
given these constraints. In a typical contextual cuing experi-
ment, participants are exposed to 12 repeated patterns and 12
random patterns. In our simulation we assumed that partici-
pants would only be able to recognize one, two, or three of the
12 repeated patterns (for which theywould therefore have a hit
rate of 1.0) and that they would guess randomly when present-
ed with any other pattern (either the 9–11 remaining repeated
patterns or the 12 random patterns). Figure 3 shows the results
of a simulation based on 1,000 simulated participants. As can
be seen, the difference between the aggregate hit and false
alarm rates is quite small in all cases. The tiny error bars
shown in Fig. 3 refer to the standard error of the means across
the 1,000 simulated participants. Using this small amount of
sampling error as a yardstick, the Cohen’s d for the difference
between hit rate and false alarm rate is only 0.44 for the case in
which participants learn only two patterns. Even under the
assumption that participants learn about three patterns it does
not reach the conventional level for a large effect. It is not
difficult to see that with just a small amount of additional
measurement error, the effect size of these differences will
be reduced to levels very similar to those found in our meta-
analysis. That is to say, the small meta-analytic effect size is
exactly what one would expect in a recognition test assuming
that participants can only recognize correctly a couple of re-
peated patterns and that they guess whenever they are asked to
identify a pattern that they do not recognize. The assumption
that learning is based on only a small number of patterns is
entirely consistent with what is known about the implicit
learning effect in contextual cuing (Schlagbauer et al., 2012;
Smyth & Shanks, 2008).
This simulation illustrates that the fact that the effect size of
awareness is small does not mean that it is insufficient to
explain or cannot be related to the (usually large) size of the
contextual cuing effect found in reaction times. Instead, the
small effect size found in awareness tests is exactly what one
would expect to find when a subtle effect is assessed with an
unreliable test. This problem does not apply to the usual mea-
sure of contextual cuing, which typically relies on hundreds of
trials and consequently yields very precise estimations (and
therefore large effect sizes) for even very subtle effects. The
asymmetry between the small effects found in the awareness
test and the large effects found in visual search facilitation can
be attributed to differences in the sensitivity of the two mea-
sures (we return to this issue later).
It is interesting to note that the superior sensitivity of con-
textual cueing measures relative to awareness tests is also
evident in experimental protocols where a brief awareness test
is sufficiently powered to detect above-chance performance.
For instance, it is widely acknowledged that contextual cueing
is explicit when natural scenes are used as contexts. In these
experiments (not included in our meta-analysis), a short test is
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usually enough to detect explicit awareness. But even so, this
effect is disproportionally smaller than the corresponding con-
textual cuing effect found in reaction times. As an example,
Brockmole and Henderson (2006, Experiment 1) found that
participants performed above chance in a location-guessing
test, and this effect was so large (dz = 1.14) that it reached
statistical significance with a small sample of only eight par-
ticipants. But even this seemingly large effect is tiny compared
to the huge size of the contextual cueing effect (dz = 6.54).
Thus, the reduced sensitivity of awareness tests is obvious
even in experiments where learning is unambiguously consid-
ered explicit and tests are adequately powered to detect above-
chance awareness.
Confidence intervals as a partial solution
to the false-negative problem
It is easy to understand how null results can be false negatives
by visually examining the CIs of the dependent variables.
Figure 4 shows CIs for studies that employed a recognition
test and that reported the mean hit and false alarm rates, and a
t- or F-value. This figure does not aim to summarize the full
results of the previous meta-analysis. It is offered only as a
way of illustrating the misleading impression produced by
null results. For the sake of simplicity we only show the CIs
of studies with the typically small samples used in contextual
cuing experiments (Ns between 14 and 18) and experiments
with relatively large samples (Ns of 36 and above). All the
experiments that meet these criteria are shown in Fig. 4.
Recall that a positive difference indicates that the propor-
tion of hits was larger than the proportion of false alarms, in
other words that participants were able to discriminate repeat-
ed from random search displays. As can be seen, for many of
the studies with small sample sizes (19/21), the CI includes
zero. Those results are usually taken as a proof that partici-
pants were unaware of learning. However, in general, these
CIs are very wide. They include not just a small region around
zero, but also a wide range of positive values. Therefore, these
studies do not allow one to conclude that participants were
unaware. They simply demonstrate that these experiments
do not permit the level of awareness to be estimated with
any precision.
In contrast, among the six experiments with the largest
sample sizes the CIs are narrower and only one of them in-
cludes zero. Interestingly, the meta-analytic 95 % CI of all the
experiments included in the figure overlaps with the CI of
every single study. In other words, although the larger exper-
iments yield significant results and the smaller experiments
tend to yield non-significant results, there is actually no con-
tradiction between them. Null results create the illusion that
there is no difference between hits and false alarms and that
participants were, therefore, unaware of learning. But the CIs
do not allow this inference to be made with any degree of
certainty. The use of CIs and graphic depiction is a powerful
method for conveying the degree of precision in the estimate
and of avoiding the temptation to interpret a failure to reject
the null as evidence in favor of the null (Cumming, 2014;
Fidler & Loftus, 2009).
Bayes Factors as an alternative solution
CIs and meta-analysis provide a particularly clear and simple
means to illustrate the uncertainty associated with underpow-
ered studies, especially when the goal of the researchers is to
draw conclusions on the basis of null results. However, an
important shortcoming of CIs is that they fail to quantify the
extent to which the results of an experiment favor the null or
the alternative hypothesis. If an experiment yields a precise
(i.e., narrow) CI around zero, it is legitimate to conclude that
the null hypothesis is probably supported by the data, or at
least that the effect is of little practical significance. But in the
absence of a means to quantify support for the null hypothesis
precisely this judgment remains somewhat arbitrary and
subjective.
In contrast, Bayes Factors provide such a means to quantify
the extent to which evidence favors the null or the alternative
hypothesis and could accordingly play an important role in
future research on contextual cuing and other implicit learning
effects (Dienes, 2015). Specifically, a Bayes Factor (BF10)
represents the ratio between the likelihood of the data given
the alternative hypothesis (1) and the likelihood of the data
given the null hypothesis (0). A BF10 larger than 3 is usually
considered to reflect substantial support in favor of the alter-
native hypothesis and values larger than 10 strong support.
Conversely, values lower than 1/3 are considered substantial
evidence and values lower than 1/10 strong support for the
null hypothesis (Wetzels, Matzke, Lee, Rouder, Iverson, &
Wagenmakers, 2011).
Fig. 3 Results of a simulation exploring the size difference between hit
rate and false alarm rate depending on the number of patterns learned by
the participant. See the main text for more details. Error bars denote
standard errors of the means across simulations
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Do the results of the awareness tests reviewed in our meta-
analysis provide more support for the null hypothesis than for
the alternative hypothesis? To answer this question, we con-
verted all the 96 effect sizes entered in the meta-analysis back
to t-values that we submitted to a Bayes Factor analysis using
a Cauchy distribution with a (default) scaling factor r = 0.707
as the alternative hypothesis. To improve the comparability of
values supporting the null hypothesis (originally bounded
from 0 to 1) with values supporting the alternative hypothesis
(originally bounded from 1 to∞), we took the logarithm of all
BF10’s, which yields a symmetric distribution where all neg-
ative values support the null hypothesis and all positive values
support the alternative hypothesis. On this logarithmic scale,
values roughly larger than 1.1 provide substantial support for
the alternative hypothesis (BF10 > 3) and values roughly larger
than 2.3 provide strong support (BF10 > 10). Conversely,
values lower than −1.1 or than −2.3 constitute substantial
and strong support for the null hypothesis.
The resulting distribution of the log(BF10)’s is depicted in
Fig. 5. Interestingly, this distribution offers some encourage-
ment for the view that contextual cueing can be implicit. The
majority of results provide some support for the null hypoth-
esis over the alternative hypothesis, suggesting that learning
was indeed unconscious in many of these studies. However, a
closer inspection of Fig. 5 also reveals an important asymme-
try between the positive and negative values. While positive
values span a wide range of values (providing not just sub-
stantial but even strong evidence for the alternative hypothe-
sis), negative values rarely go beyond −1 or −1.50 and they
never reach the −2.30 boundary. In other words, many studies
yield BF10’s more consistent with the null hypothesis (no
awareness), but the weight of this evidence is never strong.
For the sake of clarity, Fig. 5 also includes a scatter plot
depicting the relationship between BF10’s and effect sizes,
Fig. 4 Ninety-five percent
confidence intervals (CIs) of a
subset of experiments contrasting
hit rate versus false alarm rate in
recognition tests. Given the
heterogeneity of the studies
included in the figure, Q(26) =
43.73, p = .016, the meta-analytic
mean and CI shown in the last
row were computed using a
random effects model
Fig. 5 Histogram of the logarithmic Bayes Factors (BF10’s) included in
the meta-analysis. Positive values indicate support for the alternative
hypothesis (awareness) and negative values indicate support for the null
hypothesis (unawareness). The inset depicts a scatterplot of effect sizes
(Cohen’s d) and logarithmicBF10’s with the best fitting quadratic function
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together with the best fitting quadratic function. Consistent
with the assessment above, the vertex of this quadratic func-
tion, which seems to capture well the typical lower values of
log(BF10), is equal to −1.28, corresponding to an unconverted
BF10 = 0.27.
Therefore, this Bayesian analysis offers a somewhat tanta-
lizing view of the implicitness of contextual cueing that has
important implications for future research: On the one hand,
there are a large number of studies with results numerically
more consistent with the null hypothesis (no awareness) than
with the alternative hypothesis (awareness). On the other
hand, there are more experiments strongly supporting the al-
ternative hypothesis than strongly supporting the null hypoth-
esis. Fortunately, Bayesian statistics also offer a way of resolv-
ing this apparent contradiction regarding the inconclusiveness
of existing evidence. Although in NHST researchers are not
free to continue testing participants after reaching the sample
size they specified a priori, Bayesian statistics do allow re-
searchers to continue gathering data (e.g., in an awareness
test) until a specific level of precision is reached (Dienes,
2011, 2014), for instance, until the Bayes Factor becomes
larger than 10 or smaller than 1/10. This feature of Bayesian
statistics make Bayes Factors a powerful means by which
future research could establish the implicitness of contextual
cuing and other seemingly unconscious learning effects
(Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Pratte, 2007).
Correlations and post hoc data selection
We should acknowledge that many of the studies included in
the meta-analysis based their conclusion – that the contextual
cuing they obtained was implicit – not only on a null result in
an awareness test but also on one of two additional pieces of
evidence (or both): Correlations and post hoc data selection.
However both of these are statistically problematic.
The first of these refers to the finding that across partici-
pants, the magnitude of contextual cuing tends not to be sig-
nificantly correlated with the measure of awareness. For in-
stance, going back to the examples depicted in Fig. 4, Zellin,
Conci, vonMühlenen, and Müller (2013, Experiment 3) found
a marginally significant effect in the awareness test. However,
instead of concluding that learning was explicit, they went on
to estimate the correlation between the results of the awareness
test and the size of contextual cueing and found a correlation of
r = .42, p > .10. This lack of significant correlation seems on
the face of it to provide further and stronger support for the
claim that learning is implicit, but a moment’s thought reveals
that once again absence of evidence is not the same as evidence
of absence. Without knowing the CI on the correlation coeffi-
cient, we cannot evaluate howmuchweight to place on the null
result, yet authors never report such CIs. We computed the
95 % CI on the correlation coefficient obtained by Zellin,
Conci et al. (2013, Experiment 3) and found that it had lower
and upper limits of −.14 and .77. Thus the data in this study are
compatible with a true correlation as large as .77 or as low as
−.14. Similarly, Conci and von Mühlenen (2011, Experiment
2) and Preston and Gabrieli (2008) reported non-significant
correlations with 95 % CIs of [−.42 to .62] and [−.33 to .49],
respectively. Obviously, these estimations are too imprecise to
permit any strong conclusions to be drawn.
Furthermore, it is common practice to report the correlation
between explicit and implicit measures of learning only when
the explicit awareness measures yield significant results (e.g.,
Conci & von Mühlenen, 2011, Experiment 2; Geyer, Shi, &
Müller, 2010; Peterson & Kramer, 2001; Preston & Gabrielli,
2008). This is particularly problematic. In just the same way
that multiple testing increases the risk of type 1 errors, it also
increases the risk of type 2 errors. Put differently, if re-
searchers explore different awareness measures until they find
one that yields a null result, the chances that the null result will
reflect a false negative increase as the number of statistical
tests grows. To prevent type 1 errors when multiple compar-
isons are conducted it is usual to make adjustments of α, like
the Bonferroni correction. Similarly, in order to prevent type 2
errors, it would be necessary to adjust β for multiple compar-
isons, which is virtually identical to increasing statistical pow-
er, defined as 1- β.
We have argued here that studies which measure awareness
alongside some “implicit” behavioral measure can yield erro-
neous evidence if NHST leads researchers to mistake weak
awareness for null awareness. We have also noted that this
problem applies not only to the interpretation of the awareness
measure itself and whether it exceeds chance, but also extends
to interpretation of correlations between implicit and explicit
measures where absence of evidence can again be
misinterpreted as evidence of absence. One final method
may at first sight appear to avoid these problems by unequiv-
ocally ensuring null awareness: Selecting participants post
hoc who score at or below chance on the awareness measure.
If such a sample of participants (or a sample of configurations)
shows significant contextual cuing (which they do: e.g.,
Colagiuri, Livesey, & Harris, 2011; Geyer, Shi, & Müller,
2010; Geyer, Zehetleitner, & Müller, 2010; Smyth & Shanks,
2008), then surely this is clear evidence of true implicit learn-
ing? The answer to this question is an emphatic “no.” The
method is statistically unsound (Shanks & Berry, 2012).
To see this, we demonstrate that the pattern can arise even
when the awareness and behavioral measures are based on the
very same underlying representation or latent variable. We
assume that a contextual cuing experiment gives rise to a
participant acquiring knowledge of the repeating (compared
to novel) configurations that we can capture by the memory
strength variable s, which is normally distributed with mean
and standard deviation (SD) equal to 1, and with s = 0
representing the baseline of no configuration knowledge. This
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common underlying knowledge forms the basis of both the
“implicit” behavioral RT measure and the recognition aware-
ness score, measured as effect size d computed from recogni-
tion hits minus false alarms. Specifically:
RT ¼ 100sþ 30e ð1Þ
d ¼ 0:30sþ e ð2Þ
A given participant is assumed to have knowledge of the
repeating patterns, s, which is first scaled by a factor of 100 in
Eq. 1 and combined with some normally distributed random
error e which has a mean of zero and SD of 1 to yield that
participant’s implicit contextual cuing RT effect. This very
same value of s is scaled by a factor of 0.3 in Eq. 2 and
combined with independent error (it is important to emphasize
that while the same value of s features in the two equations,
the noise e added in each case is independent) to yield that
participant’s explicit awareness score. Figure 6 shows data
generated by this simple model for 1,000 simulated partici-
pants. Because of the chosen scaling factors, participants gen-
erate a mean contextual cuing RT score of 100 msec, which is
roughly the level seen in contextual cuing experiments, and a
mean awareness score of 0.30, consistent with the meta-
analytic effect. The two measures are weakly correlated, r ≈
0.3, again consistent with the data.
We now select only those simulated participants who indi-
vidually score at or below chance (d = 0) on the awareness
measure (illustrated by the open circles in Fig. 6) and we ask
what contextual cuing score we see in these “unaware” partic-
ipants. The score in these participants is ~70 msec. Despite the
fact that contextual cuing and awareness are based on the
same underlying knowledge representation in this model
(and on nothing else apart from noise), and that these partic-
ipants are selected on the basis of chance (or below chance)
awareness, they nonetheless show a highly reliable contextual
cuing effect. There is no mystery to this: It is simply a mani-
festation of regression to the mean. In noisy bivariate data, a
sample created by applying a cut-off on one dimension will
have a mean on the other dimension that is closer to the overall
mean. Note that although this demonstration concerns partic-
ipants selected post hoc, the same logic applies to configura-
tions selected in the same way (e.g., Geyer, Shi, & Müller,
2010; for a similar approach, see Conci & von Muhlenenn,
2011, Experiment 2). It implies that the logic of interpreting
significant contextual cuing in participants (or configurations)
retrospectively chosen because their awareness is at or below
chance as evidence of implicit learning can be misleading.
Lastly, note that across all of the data generated by the
model, the effect size for contextual cuing is Cohen’s d ≈ 1
while that for awareness is d ≈ 0.3 (these can be calculated
directly from Eqs. 1 and 2). Thus, confirming what we
claimed earlier, the fact that real studies might yield larger
effect sizes for contextual cuing than for awareness does not
license the conclusion that the former is based on some special
form of unconscious knowledge. It arises simply because the
model assumes a greater relative contribution of random error
to awareness measures than to contextual cuing.
Conclusions drawn by authors and impact
on publication quality
The analyses conducted so far give us reasons to suspect that
many, if not most, of the null results obtained in this kind of
awareness test can be considered false negatives. This conclu-
sion stands in stark contrast with the certainty with which au-
thors interpret these null results as strong evidence in support
for the null hypothesis. As an example, the experiment with the
widest CI in Fig. 4 is Experiment 4 from Conci and von
Mühlenen (2011). In spite of the uncertainty revealed by the
CI of the awareness test, the conclusion drawn by the authors
was that “no explicit awareness of the display repetitions could
be formed” (Conci & von Mühlenen, 2011, p. 219). Note also
the results of the two conditions analysed in Experiment 4 of
Zellin, Conci et al. (2013). Although they include zero, the CIs
do not exclude a wide range of positive values. Obviously, no
conclusion can be drawnwith any assurance from the results of
those awareness tests. However, the interpretation of the au-
thors was that “observers did not explicitly recognize the old
context-displays” (Zellin, Conci et al., 2013, p. 10).
Researchers can hardly be blamed for their tendency to
over-interpret these null results as reflecting a genuine absence
of awareness. The “implicit” status of contextual cuing is
Fig. 6 Contextual cuing (msec) plotted against awareness (recognition
hits minus false alarms, expressed in terms of effect size d) in 1,000
simulated participants. Mean contextual cuing across the entire sample
is 100 msec (rightmost vertical line), while that in the subset of simulated
participants scoring at or below d = 0 (open circles) is approximately
70 msec (dotted vertical line)
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probably one of the features that make it most attractive and
salient to the scientific community. As can be seen in the list of
studies included in the meta-analysis, the titles of most articles
include some allusion to the implicit or automatic nature of
contextual cuing. In fact, 42 of the 73 articles included in this
analysis mention the concept of implicitness in their titles.
There are obvious reasons for the emphasis on the implicit
character of contextual cuing. Figure 7 depicts the impact
factors of the journals in which the articles analysed here were
published, depending on whether they mentioned implicitness
(“implicit,” “explicit,” “awareness,” “unconscious,” or “rec-
ognition”) or not in the title. Three of the 73 articles could not
be included in Fig. 7 because they were published in journals
of books not included in Journal Citation Reports. Given that
the distribution of impact factors was highly skewed, we log-
arithmically transformed them. As suggested by Fig. 7, the
difference in mean impact factor between articles mentioning
and not mentioning implicitness was statistically significant,
t(68) = 1.98, one-tailed p = .026, d = 0.48, suggesting that
papers mentioning implicitness in their titles made their way
into higher impact-factor journals. Although this result is no
more than correlational at best, it does provide some hint
about the incentives that exist for interpreting contextual cuing
as unconscious.
Conclusions
In recent years the scientific community has witnessed
growing concern about the high rate of false positives and
unreliable results within published studies (Francis, 2012;
Ioannidis et al., 2014; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons,
2014). In contrast, the potential impact of false negatives
has remained largely ignored (Fiedler et al., 2012). This
asymmetry is natural, given that most experiments seek to
observe positive results. However, there are many areas of
psychological research where the evidential value given to
null results is critical. In fact, there are several reasons to
suspect that the over-interpretation of null results is even
more dangerous than the prevalence of false positives in
some areas of research. First, null results are inherently
ambiguous. They indicate that there is not enough support
for the alternative hypothesis, but they are silent about the
amount of support for the null hypothesis. Second, unlike
positive results, null results are surprisingly easy to obtain
by mere statistical artefacts. Simply using a small sample or
a noisy measure can suffice to produce a false negative.
The results of the present systematic review suggest that
these problems might be obscuring our view of implicit learn-
ing andmemory in particular and, perhaps, implicit processing
in general. It is popularly claimed that contextual cuing and
other implicit learning effects take place without participants
becoming aware of the representations they learn (Chun &
Jiang, 2003). Contrary to this prevalent view, we found that
the seemingly chance-level performance of participants in
awareness tests is more likely to reflect a type 2 error. The
overall proportion of positive results is too large for the null
hypothesis to be true. This proportion cannot easily be ex-
plained in terms of publication bias favoring positive results,
but is perfectly consistent with the frequency of positive re-
sults that one would expect to find, given a true but modest-
sized awareness effect, in underpowered experiments using
unreliable dependent measures. This result is also consistent
with experimental evidence suggesting that the quality of the
awareness test is a key determinant of whether contextual
cuing experiments yield “explicit” or “implicit” results
(Smyth & Shanks, 2008).
We have offered some suggestions about how future stud-
ies could provide firmer evidence for implicit learning in con-
textual cuing, including increasing sample sizes to boost pow-
er, reporting CIs, and continuing to collect awareness (e.g.,
recognition) data until the Bayes Factor crosses a boundary
of evidential support. We have also suggested that two data
analytic techniques should unequivocally be avoided in future
studies: The calculation of implicit-explicit correlations after
finding that the implicit score is significantly greater than
chance, and post hoc data selection.
Before ending, we would also like to emphasize that we do
not believe that researchers working in this area are following
these practices (e.g., using small numbers of testing trials or
relying on NHST to claim support for the null hypothesis) in a
deliberate attempt to deceive their readers. Most likely, re-
searchers are simply following routinely a research protocol
that, with its pros and cons, has become standard. It must be
Fig. 7 Impact factor of journals that published papers mentioning or not
mentioning “implicitness” in the title
Psychon Bull Rev (2016) 23:87–102 97
acknowledged that many of the experiments included in the
present meta-analysis (and especially those that made nomen-
tion of awareness in their titles) were designed primarily to
explore issues largely unrelated to the question of whether
contextual cuing is implicit or not, such as the role of working
memory in contextual cueing, how spatial associations are
formed, the neural underpinnings of contextual learning, and
so on. The fact that awareness was only a secondary concern
might explain why the vast majority of them did not include a
sensitive (and lengthy) awareness test and why they relied on
simple NHST to analyse their results. But this only serves to
illustrate how easily a particular conception can gain momen-
tum in a substantial body of literature and become part of the
zeitgeist, despite weak evidence.
Although we restricted our analyses to experiments con-
ducted within a specific implicit learning paradigm, the same
problem extends to other phenomena where participants’
awareness is discounted on the basis of NHST, such as sub-
liminal perception and other forms of unconscious learning
and implicit processing that we have not considered here
(e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Pessiglione et al., 2008). False
negatives also pose important problems for current attempts
to replicate controversial findings.
These and other examples show that null results in under-
powered studies may give the false impression that an effect is
genuinely absent when actually it is not. They can also create
the impression that there is a deep inconsistency between stud-
ies showing significant results and those yielding null results,
even when the latter just reflect a lack of statistical sensitivity.
Fortunately, researchers can resort to alternative statistical anal-
yses when they need to assess the amount of support for the
null hypothesis, including CIs, Bayes factors, and counternull
values (Cumming, 2014; Dienes, 2015; Rosenthal & Rubin,
1994; Rouder et al., 2009). The price we pay for our reluctance
to use these alternatives to NHST is that important aspects of
what we believe about cognition may be mistaken.
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Appendix 1
Literature search strategy
For the present systematic review, we accessed all the pub-
lished reports that used the standard procedure for contextual
cuing experiments. On 26 November 2013 we searched in the
Web of Science for all the papers citing the original report from
Chun and Jiang (1998). Based on the contents of the abstracts
available on the Web of Science, we removed from this list
theoretical reviews with no empirical work and also empirical
papers focused on topics different from contextual cuing. We
also removed contextual cuing papers that used natural scenes
as contexts because the cognitive processes involved in these
experiments are widely recognized to be explicit (Brockmole
& Henderson, 2006; Brockmole & Vo, 2010).
Within the remaining list of studies, we were particularly
interested in experiments whose general procedure did not de-
viate radically from the standard method described in the Intro-
duction. Specifically, we selected all the experiments in which
the location of the distractors in repeated displays predicted the
location of the target within the same static display. This crite-
rion excluded a small set of experiments on identity cuing,
temporal cuing, contextual cuing with moving patterns, and
also experiments in which distractors predicted the location of
a target presented on a subsequent search display. Finally, by
studying the reference lists of the accessed reports, we identi-
fied a small group of relevant papers that had not appeared in
our original search in the Web of Science (Geringswald,
Herbik, Hoffman, & Pollmann, 2013; Manns & Squire, 2001;
Pollmann & Manginelly, 2010; Zellin, von Mühlenen, Müller,
& Conci, 2013) and we included them among the final list of
studies. Following this procedure we identified 73 articles that
contained at least one experiment that qualified for the present
meta-analysis. All the papers included in our review aremarked
with asterisks in the References section.
Selection of experiments, conditions, and statistical tests
Only experiments including an awareness test (either a recog-
nition test or a target guessing test) were considered in the
present analysis. We ignored data from experiments in which
contextual cuing was not observed. Similarly, if an experiment
comprised several conditions and awareness test results were
reported separately for each condition, we only analysed aware-
ness tests from those conditions that yielded contextual cuing.
If the authors conducted several awareness tests (e.g., a
recognition test and a target-location guessing task) we includ-
ed all of them in our analyses. Because we were interested in
the role of the number of trials included in the awareness test
(see main text), we included several analyses of the same
condition only when these were based on blocks of trials of
different sizes. For instance, if one experiment included an
awareness test with two blocks of 24 trials each and the anal-
yses were conducted on block 1, block 2, and blocks 1 and 2
collapsed, we included all three contrasts in our analyses, cod-
ing the number of trials of each of them as 24, 24, and 48
respectively. In contrast, if the authors reported multiple anal-
yses of the results of a single awareness test, we only included
one of them, for instance, if the same data set was first used to
compare hit rate versus false alarm rate and then to compare
overall performance against chance. In cases like these,
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comparisons of hits versus false alarms were favored over
alternative analyses of the same data (such as d’ scores or
comparisons of performance against chance). The logic be-
hind this selection strategy is to extract several analyses from
a single experiment when they conveyed independent infor-
mation (different number of trials or different awareness tests)
but not when they were mere re-analyses of exactly the same
data set. Following these criteria, we obtained data from 181
statistical contrasts.
Coding of study characteristics and results
Wewere particularly interested in knowing whether the results
of the awareness tests were statistically significant or not.
Therefore, we coded non-significant results (p > .05) as 0
and significant results (p ≤ .05) as 1. If the reported data
allowed the reader to infer that a result was marginally signif-
icant (.05 < p < .10) we coded that result as 0.50. Regardless of
the significance of the statistical contrast, we also coded
whether the descriptive pattern of results went in the “explicit”
direction (e.g., hit rate > false alarm rate) or in the opposite
direction. We coded studies in the “explicit” direction as 1,
studies in the opposite direction as −1, and studies in which
hits and false alarms were equal (or in which participants
performed exactly at chance level) as 0.
For each contrast we were interested in knowing the num-
ber of participants on which the contrast was based and the
number of trials included in the awareness test, as these deter-
mine the power of the experiment to detect non-zero aware-
ness. These two variables were also coded in our datasets. The
number of participants of one experiment (Colagiuri et al.,
2011) was an outlier (z > 12) and was recoded as the number
of participants of the next largest experiment included in the
data set. Similarly, the number of trials of the awareness test
conducted in another experiment (Geyer, Shi, &Müller, 2010,
Experiment 3) was an outlier (z = 11.97) and was recoded as
the number of trials of the experiment with the next largest
number of trials in the data set. This recoding strategy is com-
mon practise in meta-analytic reviews (e.g., Hofmann,
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). The quali-
tative conclusions of our analyses are not altered by using the
actual number of participants.
Finally, although not all experiments included sufficient
information to compute an effect size estimate, when these
data were available, we did collect them. In the case of 96/
181 (53 %) contrasts, we were able to compute Cohen’s dz
scores from t-values or F-values with one degree of freedom.
We computed dz scores by dividing t-values by the square root
of the relevant sample size (note that the contrast between hits
and false alarms or between performance and chance is
within-participants for all studies in the meta-analysis). When
only F-values with one degree of freedom were reported, we
converted them to t-values. In a few cases, we detected a
contradiction between the sample size reported in the paper
and the degrees of freedom of the t and F contrasts. When this
occurred, we computed the effect size taking the degrees of
freedom reported in the statistical test as the correct estimate of
the sample size. We ignored t-values from two experiments
(Geyer, Shi, & Müller, 2010, Experiment 3; Geyer,
Zehetleitner, et al., 2010, Experiment 1) because their degrees
of freedom were reported as “t(1, 11),” making it unclear
whether they used a t distribution with 11 degrees of freedom
or an F distribution with 1 and 11 degrees of freedom.We also
ignored four t-values where the reported data did not allow us
to conclude whether the effect size was positive or negative.
The random effects meta-analysis was conducted with the
“metaphor” R package (Viechtbauer, 2010). Bayes Factors
were computed with the “BayesFactor” R package (Rouder
et al., 2009).
Coding of paper and journal characteristics
As a proxy to measure the relevance of the implicitness of
contextual cuing for each study, we coded whether the title
of the paper made allusion to the implicit character of this
effect. Papers were sorted depending on whether or not they
mentioned the words “implicit,” “explicit,” “awareness,” “un-
conscious,” or “recognition.” We also coded the 2012 impact
factor of the journals that had published the studies included in
the present meta-analysis. Because of a change in the name of
the journal, impact factors for Attention, Perception, &
Psychophysics were also used for papers published in the
journal with the previous name, Perception & Psychophysics.
All impact factors were obtained from the 2012 edition of the
Journal Citation Reports.
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